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Abstract: Among worldviews, in addition to the options of 
materialist atheism, pantheism and personal theism, there exists 
a fourth, “local emergentism”. It holds that there are no gods, nor 
does the universe overall have divine aspects or any purpose. But 
locally, in our region of space and time, the properties of matter 
have given rise to entities which are completely different from 
matter in kind and to a degree god-like: consciousnesses with 
rational powers and intrinsic worth. The emergentist option is 
compared with the standard alternatives and the arguments for 
and against it are laid out. It is argued that, among options in the 
philosophy of religion, it involves the minimal reworking of the 
manifest image of common sense. Hence it deserves a place at the 
table in arguments as to the overall nature of the universe. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The main options among world views are normally classifiable as either 
materialist atheism, pantheism (widely understood) or personal theism. 
According to materialist atheism, there exists nothing except the material 
universe as we ordinarily conceive it, and its properties are fully described 
by science (present or future). According to personal theism, there exists a 
separate entity (or entities) of a much higher form than those found in the 
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material universe, a god or gods. Between materialist atheism and personal 
theism lies a wide spectrum of views loosely describable as pantheisms: 
those in which the universe or Absolute has semidivine though non-
personal attributes greater than humankind—views like Plotinus’s 
Neoplatonism, Spinoza’s pantheism, the Absolute Idealism of the late 
Victorians, panentheism, panpsychism, deep ecology and the Confucian 
concept of the Mandate of Heaven. In recent times, views of the same 
general type have been revived in books such as John Leslie’s Value and 
Existence, Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos, Ronald Dworkin’s Religion 
Without God, Antony Flew’s There is a God, and Tim Mulgan’s Purpose in 
the Universe, which deny personal theism but argue from mental, ethical 
and aesthetic features of the universe to some non-materialist view of the 
universe as a whole. These theories are all forms of “ultimism” in the sense 
of Schellenberg—the minimal view that “there is a reality metaphysically 
and axiologically ultimate (representing the deepest fact about the nature 
of things and also unsurpassably great).”1 
Yet pantheism, even understood as widely as that, does not fill up 
all the logical space between materialist atheism and personal theism. 
There is an important but little-discussed gap between materialist atheism 
and pantheism, occupied by what could be called “local emergentism” or 
“sub-pantheism”. We will call it “emergentism” for short, although that 
term has some other uses, especially in the philosophy of mind (as 
described in the next section). 
According to emergentism, materialist atheism used to be true. One 
billion years ago, the universe contained, to the best of our knowledge, only 
material entities of the kind familiar to science, with the properties known 
to science. Then a series of unlikely but chance events took place, and it was 
revealed that the properties of matter contained the potentiality to produce, 
in one small corner of the universe, entities of a semidivine though limited 
nature—human consciousnesses with powers of reason and objective moral 
worth, capable of understanding such concepts as divinity. They are 
entities of an entirely different kind from those admitted by materialist 
atheism. But they exist only locally—they do not confer on the universe 
                                                                
1 John L. Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 2. 
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outside themselves any properties that it did not already have, nor do they 
connect with or mirror any divinity elsewhere. 
The emergentist view of the process of the coming into being of 
consciousness is an extension of what is known about the emergence of 
scientific properties. The universe might have consisted of all plasma, or 
only of hydrogen and helium atoms, but, the tuning of its constants being 
what it was (by chance), more complex atoms and molecules were able to 
form by natural processes. Their properties are determined by the solutions 
of the Schrödinger Equation, and so absolutely determined by the laws of 
physics. At a later period, further unlikely collocations of atoms produced 
biochemistry, whose new properties are again determined by the chemistry 
and physics of its components. Later again, an unlikely evolutionary path 
led to the regular appearance of human zygotes which, in the course of 
normal development, regularly give rise to consciousnesses with rational 
thought processes and moral worth. There are no causal forces behind 
these evolutionary processes other than the natural laws and random 
processes described in physics and in Darwinist theory, but the result is, as 
a strict matter of the laws of nature, the emergence of a fundamentally 
different form of existence. 
Emergentism differs from panpsychism in denying there was any 
mental aspect to the physical entities that existed prior to minds arising. By 
analogy, to say that hydrogen atoms can in some circumstances combine to 
make helium atoms is not to take a panheliumist view of hydrogen clouds. 
Hydrogen atoms have only hydrogen properties, irrespective of what 
potentialities the laws of nature provide for them. Similarly, the physical is 
purely physical, irrespective of what potentialities natural laws may have in 
store for it. 
Emergentism also differs from Searle’s “biological naturalism” 
(although that is its nearest neighbour on the spectrum in the materialist 
atheist direction). That theory has a similar view of the evolution of genuine 
consciousness as a “system property” of brains, but is committed to strict 
naturalism. Thus Searle takes consciousness to be a scientific property of 
how brains act overall, similar to the way liquidity is a scientific property of 
masses of water molecules at certain temperatures.2 Similar is the position 
                                                                
2 John R. Searle, “Biological Naturalism,” in Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 
eds. M. Velmans and S. Schneider (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2007).  Also, see 
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of “religious naturalism”, which holds that the scientific story of the cosmos 
is the complete one, but that religious attitudes and practices are 
nevertheless appropriate.3 Emergentism is not naturalist in that sense or in 
any way reductionist about consciousness. It takes consciousnesses, 
though caused by natural processes, to be sui generis and to possess 
“queer” properties such as moral worth which, for Humean reasons, cannot 
be part of the scientific world picture. 
Emergentism is agnostic about future developments. So far, the 
highest beings in the universe (known to us) are humans. That may 
continue to be the case until their extinction. Or there may be yet unrealised 
natural possibilities of further emergence, such as that consciousnesses 
may somehow merge to create a “noosphere”, or may build artificial 
intelligences which can themselves construct some different form of reality. 
If those suggestions were added to emergentism, it would resemble such 
theories as those of Hegel, Teilhard de Chardin and Samuel Alexander, 
which saw the universe progressing of necessity from a non-rational past 
to a super-rational future, in which the universe becomes in some sense 
self-aware. But those possibilities are not part of emergentism itself. Even 
if those futures did come to pass, emergentism would take a different 
attitude to them. For those thinkers, there is some positive directionality to 
the universe—“a higher type unfolded by the onward pressure of Time”, as 
Samuel Alexander put it4—a view which tends towards pantheism (or 
perhaps more exactly towards an “emergent panentheism” that preserves 
some distinction between the world and God5; whereas for emergentism 
any progress is, like the emergence of life by Darwinian evolution, a matter 
of chance. In any case, such possibilities are now unknown, and 
emergentism does not pretend to know them. 
The aim of the present article is not to defend emergentism as the 
truth or likely truth, nor to refute it, but simply to establish its prima facie 
                                                                
discussion in J.P. Moreland, “Searle’s Biological Naturalism and the Argument from 
Consciousness,” Faith and Philosophy 15 (1998). 
3 See Ursula Goodenough, The Sacred Depths of Nature (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), and “Who is a religious naturalist?” Theology and Science 15 (2017).  
4 Samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity (New York: Humanities Press, 1927), 381.  
5 For example, see Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, eds., In Whom We Live and 
Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific 
World (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004). 
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claim to serious consideration. If we wish to lay out the menu of options as 
to world views, perhaps with a view to applying Bayesian considerations to 
decide among them, it is necessary to first recognise and understand the 
range of reasonable candidates. Emergentism has not so far been properly 
focused on (in the philosophy of religion, as opposed to the philosophy of 
mind). It deserves to be. 
 
2. SENSES OF EMERGENCE IN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 
Although emergentism has not been a well-recognised option in the 
philosophy of religion, emergence has been a much discussed concept in 
the philosophy of science and in the philosophy of mind. A brief review will 
both clarify the meaning of emergentism as applicable to the philosophy of 
religion and identify what in the discussion of emergence in general is 
relevant to the philosophy of religion. It will be argued that emergence in 
science is reasonably well understood, but not relevant, while emergence 
in the philosophy of mind is relevant, but not sufficiently well understood 
to be of much help. Many of those involved in the discussion hoped to 
understand the difficult case, the emergence of consciousness, in terms of 
easier cases, such as the emergence of chemistry from physics. It will be 
argued that that project has not been successful. 
Certainly some cases of emergence seem easy to understand and to 
be philosophically unproblematic. The general idea of emergence is that 
some genuinely novel property (or substance or process) arises as a matter 
of necessity out of something that lacks that property. An instance is the 
way that chaotic behaviour in dynamical systems arises from simple rules.6 
The emergence is wholly mathematical: simple rules apply over and over, 
and the complex behaviour that arises is novel, but determined as the 
global effect of many simple local actions. It is hard to calculate with, but 
not hard to understand in principle—no harder than understanding that 
                                                                
6 James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Viking, 1987), chap. 1. In the 
philosophical literature, it is called “weak emergence”, see  Mark Bedau, “Weak Emergence 
and Context-sensitive Reduction,” in Emergence in Science and Philosophy, eds. A. 
Corradini and T. O’Connor (New York: Routledge, 2010), sec. 4, or “epistemological 
emergence”, see Philip Clayton, “Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory,” in The Re-
Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, eds. P. 
Clayton and P. Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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many small movements in one straight line add up to a large movement in 
the same straight line. 
There are strong reasons to believe that many, but not all, of the 
important scientific cases of emergence are no more obscure than that. The 
emergence of chemistry from physics appears to be explicable without 
remainder as the properties of solutions of the Schrödinger equation. 
Dirac asserted in the first years of quantum mechanics that “The 
underlying physical laws necessary for the mathematical theory of a large 
part of physics and the whole of chemistry are thus completely known, and 
the difficulty is only that the exact application of these laws leads to 
equations much too complicated to be soluble.”7 The pioneers of quantum 
chemistry believed that “In so far as quantum mechanics is correct, 
chemical questions are problems in applied mathematics.”8 Their 
optimism has been strongly confirmed as increases in computational 
power permit approximate solutions of the equations, which are found to 
agree with experimental results and to predict the properties of molecules 
yet to be made. In that case, chemical properties arise from (quantum) 
physical ones in exactly the same way as chaos emerges from simple rules. 
Solving a differential equation such as the Schrödinger equation (whether 
exactly or approximately) is simply extracting the global structure implied 
by the local structure, which is the business solely of mathematics.9 Being 
mathematics, it is unmysterious. 
That already casts a more reductionist light on some of the 
examples of emergence that were intended to provide models for the 
emergence of mind. George Henry Lewes’s initial idea of emergence was to 
contrast the emergence of the novel properties of water from hydrogen and 
oxygen with the merely mechanical “resultant” of the sums of forces.10 
                                                                
7 P.A.M. Dirac, “Quantum Mechanics of Many-Electron Systems,” Proceedings of the 
Royal Society A 123 (1929): 714.  
8 Henry Eyring et al., Quantum Chemistry (New York: Wiley, 1944), iii. Despite 
warnings by some philosophers of chemistry that the explanation is not yet complete, see 
Robin Hendry, “Prospects for Strong Emergence in Chemistry,” in Philosophical and 
Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation, eds. M.P. Paoletti and F. Orilia (New 
York: Routledge, 2017).   
9 James Franklin, “Global and local,” Mathematical Intelligencer 36, no. 4 (Dec. 2014).  
10 George Henry Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, vol.  2 (Boston: Osgood, 1875), 368-
370.  
  
 
 
James Franklin  
 
    
 2019 Philosophical Association of the Philippines 
 
7 
Similarly Searle distinguished between system properties such as shape, 
weight and velocity that can be deduced from the way the components are 
arranged from “causally emergent system features” like solidity, liquidity 
and transparency (the latter to be compared with the emergence of mind).11 
We now know that solidity, liquidity and transparency arise in the same 
way as weight arises from addition of the weight of components: it is just 
mathematics working itself out. That is why quantum mechanics proved 
such a blow to the British emergentism of C.D. Broad and Samuel 
Alexander—the emergence whose mysteriousness they sought to 
emphasise had been demystified.12 
It is likely—though less certain given the complexity of the subject-
matter—that the same sort of merely mathematical emergence is 
responsible for the way the properties of living things arise from 
biochemistry. Organic chemistry is just chemistry, but the complex 
potentialities of carbon bonding imply the great variety of organic 
molecules up to proteins and DNA, while the necessity of protein folding 
produces properties that are sufficient for many aspects of life.13 The 
project of explaining the properties and activities of living things in terms 
of the chemical, physical and resulting geometrical properties of their 
components is going very well. 
At a higher level, there is also good progress on understanding how 
social and economic phenomena emerge from individual psychology. 
Game theoretical considerations allow us to understand how interpersonal 
communication and social properties like prices and political entities are 
generated, again in a purely mathematical way, from individual minds 
interacting with and second-guessing one another.14  
                                                                
11 John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992), 
111-112.  
12 Brian P. McLaughlin, “The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism,” in Emergence or 
Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, eds. A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. 
Kim (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992), 54-55.  
13 For example, see Bruce Alberts et al., “The Shape and Structure of Proteins,” in 
Molecular Biology of the Cell, 4th ed. (New York and London: Garland Science, 2002). 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK26830/.   
14 For example, see Keith R. Sawyer, Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), and John Searle, Making the Social 
World: The Structure of Human Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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For present purposes, it is not important whether the projects of 
explaining life as emergent from biochemistry and social life as emergent 
from individual decisions are totally successful. What is significant is only 
that it is clear how they are supposed to work and that they show good 
promise of explaining at least a large part of the phenomena they are 
intended to explain. 
What needs to be examined is whether those reasonably well-
understood forms of emergence provide a model for the case of emergence 
that is the key to emergentism as a position in the philosophy of religion, 
the emergence of mind and ethics from living matter. It will be argued that 
it does not, and that research over the last century has shown the stark 
contrast between the gradually better-known cases of emergence just 
discussed, and the anomalous case of mind. Discussion will be left to the 
section on reasons against emergentism. 
 
3. REASONS FAVOURING EMERGENTISM 
The great strength of emergentism (in the philosophy of religion) is that it 
takes things to be more or less as they seem. Personal theism has a hidden 
God whose existence must be inferred or taken on faith. Pantheism and 
panpsychism attribute purpose and some measure of divinity to what looks 
like, frankly, a pretty ordinary pile of rocks. Materialist atheism requires a 
savage and on the face of it implausible deconstruction of consciousness 
and ethics as a mere concourse of atoms and evolved custom of tribes. Even 
its supporters have generally admitted a large explanatory gap between 
purely material base and mental and ethical superstructure; as D.M. 
Armstrong says, a materialist can admit that ordinary experience (such as 
of mental images) involves the illusion of the truth of anti-materialism 
(which then needs to be explained away).15 John Mackie’s account of why 
                                                                
Classically it is found in Kurt Lewin, “Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method and 
Reality in Social Science; Social Equilibria and Social Change,” Human Relations 1 (1947). 
For an analysis,  see Georg Theiner and Timothy O’ Connor, “The Emergence of Group 
Cognition,” in Emergence in Science and Philosophy eds. A. Corradini and T. O’Connor 
(New York: Routledge, 2010).  
15 David M. Armstrong, “The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of 
Materialism,” Analysis 29 (1968). For further discussion, see Martine Nida-Rümelin, “What 
about the Emergence of Consciousness Deserves Puzzlement?” in Emergence in Science 
and Philosophy eds. A. Corradini and T.O’ Connor (New York: Routledge, 2010).  
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any kind of objective moral values would be metaphysically “queer” entities 
in a materialist universe is well-known.16 
Emergentism, on the other hand, takes things to be much as they 
seem. Rocks and galaxies are just rocks and galaxies. Humans, on the other 
hand, are a quite different kind of being: consciousness is, as it seems to 
be, truly unique, quite unlike anything that existed in the universe 
beforehand. That much is the thesis of emergentism in the philosophy of 
mind. But it is natural to add the objectivity and emergence of ethical 
properties, based on the loosely Kantian idea of the supervenience of the 
moral worth of persons on their rationality (or closely related properties 
such as their capacity for free action on the basis of practical rationality). 
Kantian claims that man is “an end in himself, that is, he possesses a 
dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself 
from all other rational beings in the world”17 can be taken literally. The 
death of a human is a tragedy, but the explosion of a lifeless galaxy is merely 
a firework. Emergentism preserves that distinction, whereas materialist 
atheism threatens to undermine it and theism merely adds an external 
divine commendation for what should be already obvious and intrinsic. 
Emergentism can thus reasonably claim to be the world view which 
requires the most minimal reworking of the manifest image of common 
sense. 
The regularity with which zygotes grow into persons with 
consciousness (unless some medical cause prevents it) is in tune with the 
emergentist story. Prima facie, there is no need for the infusion of a soul 
by an external divinity. The embryo body develops gradually, and then as 
the biological structure becomes capable of supporting it, automatic 
responses, then feelings, then higher cognitive functions develop in parallel 
with bodily progress. If ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, as it may do in 
this case, there was a similar, naturally determined, development of 
consciousness from biological matter over a long time scale. In both the 
short and long time scales, the apparent gradualness of biological and 
mental development side by side (or rather exactly co-located) suggests a 
                                                                
16 John Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 
38.  
17 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. M. Gregor (1797; repr., 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 186. 
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close connection between the two, with the necessity of natural law. It 
suggests too that if an identical entity came to be by some other causal path, 
for example if we constructed a zygote molecule by molecule with a finely 
detailed 3D printer, the result would be expected to possess all the 
properties of a naturally-occurring zygote, including growing a 
consciousness. If that is all true, the most reasonable conclusion is that the 
consciousness-producing system is a fully natural process, as emergentism 
holds, however much we might emphasise the uniqueness of consciousness 
and ethical worth. 
Finally, emergentism supports the autonomy of ethics—its 
autonomy, that is, both from divine commands and from natural science. 
Since Socrates’s discovery of the Euthyphro Dilemma, it has been 
problematic to explain what God and his commands could have to do with 
ethics, except perhaps at the margins. External commands seem the wrong 
kind of thing to make something good.18 On the other hand, the extensive 
work on Hume’s is-ought gap shows how ethics is autonomous also from 
purely naturalist properties of things, as revealed by science.19 An 
emergentism in which ethical properties such as worth supervene on 
essential human properties such as rationality and free will accords with 
the ideas commonly taken to underlie usual morality and human rights.20 
Murder is wrong, in the first instance, because the victim’s being dead is an 
evil for him, and that is so because of his intrinsic worth. It seems that the 
commands of God or man cannot make that so, nor make it be otherwise. 
And if other humans emerged by any process, natural, artificial or divine, 
murdering them would equally be wrong, because of their intrinsic worth 
and hence their right to remain in existence when possible. Emergentism 
provides a self-contained story about how beings of ethical worth arose, 
without the need to postulate any external creative agencies, nor to explain 
                                                                
18 David O. Brink, “The Autonomy of Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, 
ed. M. Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
19 Frank Jackson, “Autonomy of ethics,” in International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Wiley, 
2013). https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee015. 
20 See Alan Donogan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1977), 65-66, and Nicholas Wolterstorff and Terence Cuneo, “Grounding the Rights We 
Have as Human Persons,” in Understanding Liberal Democracy: Essays in Political 
Philosophy, eds. N. Wolterstorff and T. Cuneo (New York : Oxford University Press, 2012), 
218-220.  
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how, if they did exist, they could play any role in interfering with the 
intimate and necessary connection between a being’s intrinsic natural 
properties and its ethical worth.  
One consequence for philosophy of religion is that if emergentism 
is a viable option, there can be no “moral argument for God”. 
 
4. REASONS AGAINST EMERGENTISM 
The initial reasons against emergentism in general are those that have 
always stood in the way of its subthesis, emergentism in the philosophy of 
mind. They are summed up in McGinn’s well-known dictum that the 
human brain is “just the wrong kind of thing to give birth to consciousness. 
You might as well assert that numbers emerge from biscuits or ethics from 
rhubarb.”21 The logical gap22  between naturalist cause (physical reality) 
and non-naturalist effect (consciousness and ethical worth) is very large. A 
century of work that better understands each side of the gap has not 
narrowed it. Physical processes, evolved adaptive behaviour and game 
theoretical “altruism” are on one side of the gap; consciousness, action on 
the basis of recognition of reasons, and objective ethical worth are on the 
other. The more we have come to understand what is on each side, the more 
mysterious has become the suggestion that the second can emerge from the 
first. 
The gap is most discussed with respect to consciousness itself. The 
extensive work on the “hard problem” of consciousness, from Descartes to 
the present, is designed to shore up the intuition that consciousness really 
is sui generis, and its emergence is not like the emergence of life from 
chemistry.23 Only a very strong a priori commitment to naturalism 
normally issues in reductionist views of consciousness, and the details of 
                                                                
21 See Colin McGinn, “Consciousness and Cosmology: Hyperdualism Ventilated,” in 
Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, eds. M. Davies and G.W. 
Humphreys (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 160 and J.P. Moreland, Consciousness and the 
Existence of God (New York: Routledge, 2008).  
22 Referred to as “explanatory gap”, see Joseph Levine, “Materialism and Qualia: The 
Explanatory Gap,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983). Also, see Martine Nida-
Rümelin, “What about the Emergence of Consciousness Deserves Puzzlement?” 
23 David Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 2 (1995). 
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how the brain is supposed to give rise to it are left to ever more speculative 
future science. 
That lack of understanding is only deepened by the efforts of 
emergentists to explain how consciousness and rational thought might 
arise from the brain. A leading attempt is William Hasker’s The Emergent 
Self.24 It exposes powerfully the defects of dualism and the inability of 
materialism to account for free action on the basis of reasons. But its only 
suggestion on how the emergence of mind works is that it is something like 
a magnetic field, “as a magnet generates a magnetic field, so the brain 
generates its field of consciousness”.25 Hasker mentions controversies on 
the ontology of fields, but prefers his analogy to keep to a naïve level of 
physical understanding. That is uninformative just because magnetic fields 
are merely physics, so the analogy has nothing to say about the hard 
question, that is, how something that is admitted to be so unlike the 
physical can emerge from it. Even if we did understand fully how physical 
fields arise, we would have made little advance on the hard problem of 
mentality. 
But in addition to those well-known issues in the philosophy of 
mind, it is not just consciousness and qualia themselves that create a 
problem. Thinking something for reasons, and acting freely for reasons, 
appear to involve a different order of reality from being impelled by causes. 
Kant points out that there is something incoherent in believing for objective 
logical reasons the proposition that one’s beliefs are determined by 
changeable physical causes rather than reasons; similarly it is very difficult 
to act as if one’s actions are not free.26 In developing the argument (as an 
argument against materialism) Hasker asks us to imagine a zombie-
world… 
 
indistinguishable from the actual world in all physically 
observable respects, but completely lacking in mentality. In 
                                                                
24 William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).  
25 Ibid., 190.  
26 Immanuel Kant, “Review of Schulz’s Attempt at an Introduction to a Doctrine of 
Morals for All Human Beings Regardless of Different Religions,” in Immanuel Kant: 
Practical Philosophy, trans. M.J. Gregor (1783; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). For the clarification of the argument, see Allen Wood, Kantian Ethics (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 131-132.   
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such a world organisms would still flee from danger, seek 
food and sex, and complain about the weather (or emit 
sounds interpretable as complaints about the weather), just 
as they do in the actual world. The lack of any actual 
subjective states would make no difference whatever to the 
physical course of events, or to the survival or perishing of 
any creature. What this means is that, given the physicalist 
assumption, the occurrence and content of conscious mental 
states such as belief and desire are irrelevant to behavior 
and are not subject to selection pressures.27  
 
Fitting rational thought and free action into materialist atheism has 
always been recognised as very difficult. But it is hard to see how 
emergentism is in a better position. In principle, it does have more 
resources, since it admits more kinds of reality than materialist atheism. 
But it must explain how to deploy those resources to account for rationality 
and freedom. Simply saying “they emerge” gives no insight into what could 
be happening. 
The equally extensive work in support of Hume’s is-ought gap is 
similarly intended to show that ethics, including the ethical worth of 
persons, is also sui generis, and not possibly exhausted by, or logically 
implied by, non-ethical properties. That is aimed initially at materialism, 
but as with rationality, emergentism has a problem explaining how it can 
do better. 
We understand, in principle and in some degree of detail, how 
biochemistry gives rise to life. We do not understand in the least how life 
can give rise to consciousness, logical reasoning, ethical intuitions, free 
actions, or understanding itself. Emergentists have not offered a clear 
account of how they propose to bridge these gaps. 
Our lack of comprehension is pointed up by what might seem at first 
a parallel case, the way in which numerical computation arises from 
electronics in a calculator. The succession of numerals on the display can 
be described both as the deterministic effects of electronic circuitry and 
electrical impulses, and as the addition of numbers. In one way, that 
                                                                
27 William Hasker, The Emergent Self, 78-79.  
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parallels the way in which logical reasoning in the brain can arise from the 
action of neurons: the reasoning (respectively calculation) has to be 
supported by a sufficiently structured neuronal (respectively electronic) 
process. But there is a significant flaw in the parallel. In the case of the 
calculator, not only is the mind of an engineer needed to design and build 
the correlations between electronic processes and addition in the Platonic 
realm of numbers, but also a mind is needed to interpret the display as 
numerical symbols signifying numbers. Flickering lights on a display are 
not numbers. They are only physical patterns, which have to be interpreted 
by a mind as discrete symbols representing numbers. But logical reasoning 
in the brain is self-interpreting. It knows itself as being logic—in Kantian 
terms, it involves not only having reasons but recognising them as 
compelling reasons.28 That is what is strange about it, and what makes it a 
central exhibit in the contrast between the ways of consciousness and the 
ways of physics. 
The Artificial Intelligence project has also reinforced the sharpness 
of the break between non-mind and mind, though it was premised on 
overcoming it. The better we understand the difference between adaptive 
behaviour, imitable by computer, and true mentality, the stronger the 
distinction appears. Artificial Intelligence has succeeded in imitating many 
effects of human thinking, but it does so by workarounds that we, the 
human observers who did the programming, can see are unlike actual 
thinking. It has proved to be quite possible to program adaptive behaviour 
(sometimes tendentiously called “intelligent” behaviour), in devices like 
smart bombs. It is possible for google translate to make a fair imitation of 
language translation by statistical analyses of vast corpora of human-
translated texts. But the better we understand the algorithmic and 
statistical tricks by which such feats are accomplished, the more we see the 
difference between them and human conscious rational thought. The 
contrast is most evident with understanding itself—the human mental act 
of understanding why something must be so. In the following diagram, we 
can not only see that 2 × 3 = 3 × 2, we can understand why 2 × 3 must be 3 × 229:  
 
                                                                
28 Henry E. Allison, “Kant’s Refutation of Materialism,” Monist 72 (1989), sec. 3.  
29 Catherine Legg and James Franklin, “Perceiving Necessity,” Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 98 (2017). 
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Fig 1. Why 2 × 3 = 3 × 2 
 
There is no hint of how to do that or imitate it by Artificial Intelligence. 
Emergentism does have some resources for replying to these 
arguments. One is a simple tu quoque: if the relations of consciousness, 
rational understanding and free action to their material base are obscure 
on the emergentist theory, they seem to be no clearer on contending 
theories. The difficulties of materialism in accounting for any of those were 
where the problem started, while personal theism seems to have no clear 
alternative story, for example as to how a divinely created immaterial soul 
might interact with a brain.30 Its second line of reply would be that the 
dividing line between subrational nature and rational consciousness, 
reasoning and free will cannot be as sharp as claimed, since it is crossed 
gradually in fetal as well as evolutionary development, and in any case the 
higher animals, which clearly possess qualia, also exhibit a kind of 
semirational planning in the pursuit of (at least short-term) goals. In that 
case, the gradual crossing of the divide, if not simply and mysteriously 
miraculous, appears to be, in the absence of alternative explanations, some 
kind of emergence, however poor our understanding of it may be. 
Other than that, emergentism (as a philosophy of religion) faces 
competition from positive arguments for opposing views. Emergentism 
does not fit with the traditional arguments for the existence of God. 
                                                                
30 William Hasker, The Emergent Self, chap. 7.  
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(Certainly some form of emergence is quite compatible with traditional 
theism, as God could act via emergence—indeed Hasker has such a theory 
and there is a range of possibilities31—but the emergentism being 
considered here is a free-standing variety in which rationality, freedom and 
so on arise completely of their own accord.) Cosmological and teleological 
arguments both conclude that there is a being beyond the physical world, 
who creates, sustains and orders it. Similarly for considerations based on 
the anthropic principle—if the universe must be fine-tuned for life to 
appear, then there must be a powerful being capable of calculating to many 
decimal places in order to do the fine-tuning. If there is any force in those 
arguments, they tell against emergentism, which has no outside being 
whatsoever. Emergentism is thus a theory for those who find no logical 
force in any of the traditional arguments for the existence of God (or any 
attractiveness in faith without argument or reliance on historical 
arguments from scripture), but who nevertheless have a strong sense of the 
essential difference between humans and material objects. 
 
5. COMPARISON WITH RELIGION: THE “RELIGION OF 
HUMANITY” 
Emergentism lacks any outside gods, so there is no outside force or 
direction of the universe to align oneself with or request favours from. 
Therefore many of the consolations of religion are unavailable to it. But not 
all. 
If one seeks meaning in life, in a sense stronger than the purely 
psychological “what people take to give their life meaning”, one may find 
that materialist atheism precludes that kind of meaning by eliding the 
distinction between persons who matter and physical objects which don’t. 
In that case emergentism provides a distinct contrast. Other people really 
do matter, absolutely speaking; indeed so does oneself. Good and evil, in 
the human world, are as they seem to be, and the importance and 
preciousness of human life and its development is insisted on. Any efforts 
                                                                
31 Niels Henrik Gregerson, “Emergence: What is at Stake for Religious Reflection?” in 
The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, 
eds. P. Clayton and P. Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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made on behalf of the good of humans are therefore worthwhile, absolutely 
speaking, and so can give life an objective meaning.  
Of course, efforts on behalf of humans will not help much in the 
long run, when the human race redissolves into the flux without remainder. 
Alan Donagan remarks, “if Kantian duty-based ethics are true, then either 
something like Judaism or Christianity must be true, or human life is 
ultimately tragic.”32 Emergentism takes the second of these options. 
As to prayer, there is no point to petitionary prayer, as there is no-
one to pray to (unless there is some sort of unconscious telepathy between 
humans, which on present knowledge is unlikely). Nor is there any basis 
for or point in awe at the wonder of the universe; the universe is just mostly 
the blind and uninteresting stuff it seems to be. Awe and wonder should be 
reserved for people and their achievements. There could in principle be 
some point in meditatory prayer, which may have the ability to enhance the 
soul and give it access to experience that is, so to speak, more divine. The 
Hindu tradition of the Vedanta promises something like that: literal 
divinity for the mind by long meditative and ascetic technique, without any 
outside personal God as causative agent. (That is, the original Vedanta of 
the Upanishads, with its emphasis on the Ātman or inner self, often 
combined with its identity with Brahman or ultimate reality.)33 
Emergentism does not include a commitment to such possibilities, but 
neither does it rule them out. 
A promise of immortality seems unlikely, as there is no outside 
being to rescue the soul from the decay and death of the body to which it is 
so intimately linked. Immortality would not be totally out of the question if 
one went further than the mainstream of emergentism and took a strongly 
Cartesian view of the emergence of mind, regarding mind as a separate 
non-material substance created by but separable from the body.34 Such a 
non-material substance might have the ability to survive death. But it is a 
mystery what state that separated soul could be in without divine help, 
                                                                
32 Alan Donagan, “Comments on Dan Brock and Terrence Reynolds,” Ethics 95 (1985). 
33 For example, see D.C. Mathur, “The Concept of Self in the Upanishads: An Alternative 
Interpretation,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (1972).  
34 Uwe Meixner, The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism 
(Paderborn: Mentis, 2004). 
 
  
 2019 Philosophical Association of the Philippines 
 
18          Emergentism as an Option in the Philosophy of Religion 
 
while alleged reports from souls on “the other side” as promised by the 
spiritualism of a hundred years ago have come to nothing.  
Emergentism may not be a natural foundation for an institutional 
church, perhaps partly accounting for its low profile historically. The 
communal, social, tribal and charitable aspects of organised religions could 
just possibly be supported by a “religion of humanity” that lacks an outside 
God to worship. But not easily. Worship of humanity has a certain drabness 
that has always cast a pall over attempts like the Ethical Societies of 
Victorian times and Alain de Botton’s proposal of an atheist church.35 To 
regard oneself as the best the universe can do in the way of divinity is 
uninspiring, even dispiriting. Notwithstanding the feeble attempts of 
megalomaniac potentates in ancient times to represent themselves as 
divinities, solidarity is a more appropriate attitude to one’s conspecifics 
than worship. 
On the ethical front, while emergentism insists on, indeed takes 
part of its motivation from, the intrinsic moral worth of humans, it may 
have difficulty establishing their equality of moral worth. If we are all 
“made in the image of God”, our equality is to be expected; but if not, any 
substantial inequalities at birth, such as those arising from disabilities, 
might be enhanced by later intellectual or spiritual developments, and the 
claims of some to be a master-race could be hard to refute.36 
While emergentism has not had serious explicit consideration given 
to it in the philosophy of religion, it may be speculated that a certain 
amount of its perspective is implicit in actual people’s mindsets. Secular 
humanism, for example, is officially committed to materialist atheism, but 
its adherents often speak in terms of absolute human rights and the 
absolute importance of human persons in ways that are prima facie 
incompatible with regarding humans as essentially the same kind of thing 
as animals or galaxies. On the other hand, there are suspicions that some 
church attendees, especially in the more middle-of-the-road churches, do 
                                                                
35 See David Saville Muzzey, Ethics as Religion (New York: Routledge, 2008), and Alan 
De Botton, Religion for Atheists: A Non-believer’s Guide to the Uses of Religion (New York: 
Pantheon, 2012).   
36 Jeremy Waldron, Ones Another’s Equals: The Basis of Human Equality (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 2017), especially chap. 5. 
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not really believe in, or at least gravely suspect the existence of, a literal 
deity “out there”. Their churchgoing commitment is in such cases not 
entirely a fiction, however, but reflects a belief in human dignity as 
embodied in the church’s tradition. The philosophy implicit in both the 
more ethically serious secular humanists and the more theologically 
lukewarm churchgoers thus leans toward an implicit emergentism. 
In any case, emergentism deserves serious examination so that the 
range of options among world views can become clear. 
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